Young People at Risk: Challenges and Policy Options for the UK by Sage, Daniel
Young people at risk:  
Challenges and policy options for the UK
These include the large numbers of excluded and 
unemployed young people who are disengaged from  
the welfare state. As a result, thousands fail to re- 
ceive any kind of economic or back-to-work support.  
In addition, different groups face distinct labour 
market pressures. These include those not in educa- 
tion, employment or training (‘NEETs’), graduates 
struggling to find skilled work and the relatively large 
number of long-term young unemployed. Living 
standards for young people have also declined, driven 
by lack of welfare support, precarious work and stag-
nant wages.
Government reactions have varied since the financial 
crisis began in 2008. The Labour government under 
Gordon Brown prioritized the creation of subsidized 
jobs, predominantly in the public and third sectors,  
Executive Summary
The UK, despite a marked labour market improvement 
in recent years, still faces a wide range of challenges 
in tackling disadvantage and social exclusion amongst 
young people. The risk of child poverty and material 
deprivation has risen in recent years and the UK fares 
significantly worse on such measures compared to 
similar EU countries. 
Within this context, some particular challenges emerge. 
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The UK has seen the share of young people at risk of poverty or social exclusion rise 
to as high as 32.6 percent. In order to improve social inclusion for the British Youth, 
three challenges have to be mastered.
PolicyBrief
Daniel Sage, University of the West of Scotland and  
Policy Network, Daniel.Sage@uws.ac.uk
2  
sim europe POLICY BRIEF #2016/01
On this measure, the UK is now below the EU aver-
age and behind countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Croatia and Slovakia (see Figure 1). 
This trend should be of profound concern to UK politi- 
cians and policy-makers. Youth disadvantage has  
well-known and deep scarring effects: increased likeli-
hood of future benefit dependency, lower earnings  
and poor physical and mental health. It also has signif-
icant economic consequences, including higher wel- 
fare spending and lost revenue in potential tax receipts.
The precarious social position of many children and 
young people continues to be one of the most press-
ing social policy challenges across the EU. As Social 
Inclusion Monitor (SIM) Europe’s 2015 Social Justice 
Index (SJI) report has shown, conditions for Europe’s 
young people have deteriorated significantly since 
2008. Whilst such deterioration has been most prom-
inently experienced in some of the southern European 
states—especially Greece, Italy and Spain—the UK 
has also fared poorly. Between 2008 and 2015, SIM 
Europe observed a notable decline in the UK’s Child 
and Youth Opportunity Index Score from 5.23 to 5.03. 
to prevent the well-known ‘scarring effects’ of youth 
unemployment. Under David Cameron’s leadership, 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition govern-
ment and the now majority Conservative govern- 
ment have taken different approaches. These have 
included wage subsidies for private sector employ- 
ers, increased benefit conditionality and the tighten-
ing of eligibility criteria for social security payments.
Whilst the UK’s relatively buoyant labour market is  
often seen as a model for high unemployment 
countries, the UK can also learn from effective poli-
cies in other EU states to overcome some of its  
own particular problems. These include the much 
stronger efficacy of education-to-work transitions 
in countries such as Austria and Germany, the higher 
spending that countries such as Denmark and Finland 
devote to human capital programmes for the unem-
ployed and the advanced family policies in the Nordic 
states. Such policies could help the UK overcome 
some of its short- and long-term youth problems.
The prospect of the UK’s exit from the EU – ‘Brex-
it’ – may intensify some of the challenges faced  
by young people, especially those who are particularly 
disadvantaged. Whilst advocates of Brexit argue  
that lower migration could benefit young people in the 
labour market, there is little evidence for this. Fur-
ther, young people in struggling regions benefit from 
European Social Fund investment to promote jobs. 
Without this funding, a significant gap in provision 
could emerge.
To tackle youth exclusion, the government should fo-
cus on three areas. First, it should seek to better inte-
grate unemployed young people within the structures 
of the welfare state. This would make more young 
people eligible for welfare-to-work support, promote 
re-employment and reduce poverty levels. 
Second, the government should strengthen the tran-
sition between education and work for all young  
people. This will involve encouraging all capable young 
people of remaining in full-time academic educa-
tion, whilst ensuring that the others benefit from high 
quality training providing them with the hard skills 
employers need. 
Third and finally, the government should move quick - 
ly to implement policies that boost family incomes 
and tackle child poverty. The most valuable route is 
to build quickly upon policies designed to incentivize 
dual parental employment, such as shared leave, the 
right to flexible work and free childcare. 
1. 
Introduction
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Figure 1
SJI CHILD AND YOUTH OPPORTUNITY SCORE 2015
Source: Social Justice Index (SJI), 2015
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The UK’s relatively poor performance on youth oppor-
tunity is manifested in a deteriorating and compara-
tively weak record on living conditions for under-18s. 
As Table 2 shows, in 2015 32.6 percent of under-18s in 
the UK were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
Significantly, this was a higher rate than recorded  
in previous SJI reports in both 2014 (31.2 percent) and 
2011 (27.4 percent) and shows more young people  
at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the UK than in 
nearby and comparable countries. As Table 3 shows, 
the UK has a significantly higher rate of poverty or 
social exclusion amongst under-18s compared to other 
EU countries in Northern Europe. 
The same pattern can be observed in relation to the  
number of young people experiencing severe mate- 
 rial deprivation in the UK. This has been increasing  
both over time—from 6.3 percent in 2008 to 10.5  
percent in 2015—and is higher than in other countries.  
For example, severe material deprivation in Sweden 
is just 1.9 percent. The social situation in the UK is 
more broadly reflected in its relatively poor results 
across the 2015 SJI. In 2015, the UK reported a SJI score 
of 5.97, only slightly higher than the overall EU  
average (5.63) and significantly lower than the coun- 
tries in Table 3, such as Sweden (7.23), Denmark 
(7.10), the Netherlands (6.84), Germany (6.52),  
Belgium (6.19) and France (6.18).
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Table 2. Under-18s Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion and  
Experience of Severe Material Deprivation in the UK 2008–2015
2008 2011 2014 2015
Young people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 27.6 27.4 31.2 32.6
Young people experiencing severe material deprivation    6.3    4.4 12.3 10.5
Source: SJI, 2015.
Table 3. Under-18s Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion and  
Experience of Severe Material Deprivation in Northern Europe 2015
UK BE DK FR DE NL SE
Young people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 32.6 21.9 15.5 21.3 19.4 17.0 16.2
Young people experiencing severe material 
deprivation
10.5    6.8    3.9    6.0    5.6    2.3    1.9
Source: SJI, 2015.
However, at the same time as the social situation for 
children and young people has deteriorated in the  
UK, that for older people appears to be improving in 
relative terms. Thus, whilst 32.6 percent of un-
der-18s are at risk of poverty or social exclusion and 
10.5 percent experience severe material deprivation, 
the corresponding figures for older people are just 
18.1 percent and 1.9 percent respectively. As the 2015 
SJI report argues, this is a trend in evidence across 
Europe as governments have prioritized expenditure  
on older people. The UK is, therefore, not unique in 
this regard, with recent governments having main-
tained universal pensioner benefits, such as winter 
fuel payments and TV licences, and introduced a 
‘triple lock’ system that ensures the UK state pension 
rises by at least 2.5 percent each year.
Yet the challenge the UK faces in relation to youth 
opportunity is not simply a new, post-crisis phe-
nomenon. In 2008 as in 2015, the UK lagged behind 
the overall EU average Child and Youth Opportunity 
Score. Hence, whilst the financial crisis and subse- 
quent recessions have created short-term prob- 
lems and turned the spotlight on the situation of young 
people, youth disadvantage is a more profound, 
structural and long-term issue for the UK.
Within this broader context, both youth unemploy-
ment and the number of NEETs began to rise in the 
years prior to the financial crisis. As Figure 4 shows, 
youth unemployment amongst both 16-17 and  
18-24 year-olds began to increase from the mid-2000s 
and, although unemployment rates for both age 
groups have fallen during the past two years, they are 
yet to reach the low levels of the early 2000s. 
In addition, in the years prior to the financial crisis a  
substantial minority of around 10 percent of young 
people persistently struggled with the transition from  
education to work, ultimately becoming NEET,  
despite sustained economic and employment growth 
over the same time period (AVECO, 2012). Evidence 
also suggests that many young people have slipped 
out of sight altogether, with large numbers neither 
registered as in work, education or in receipt of social 
security payments (Work Foundation, 2012). The  
UK consequently faces a dual challenge: from the  
short-term shock imposed by the economic crisis  
to the long-term, more structural problems that saw 
youth disadvantage climb from the mid-2000s and 
increasing numbers of young people excluded from 
the welfare state.
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Figure 4
UK YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES SINCE 2000
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However, despite these long-term insecurities, the 
past two years have seen marked labour market 
improvements, as evidenced in Figure 4. The 2015 
UK unemployment rate for 15-24 year-olds, at 16.9 
percent in total, was lower than for both 2014 (20.7 
percent) and 2011 (19.9 percent) and is almost at  
the 2008 pre-crisis level of 15 percent. The UK labour 
market performs more strongly for young people 
than in many other EU countries, most notably the  
crisis-hit southern European states but also Bel- 
gium (23.2 percent), France (24.2 percent) and Sweden 
(22.9 percent). As Figure 5 shows, in 2015 the UK  
had the eighth best performing labour market for young 
people. Further, the UK is one of only five countries 
to report an improved SJI score since 2008.
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Figure 5
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 2015
7.7
10.3
11.8
12.6
12.7
15.0
15.9
16.9
19.3
19.6
20.2
20.4
20.5
22.6
22.9
23.2
23.8
23.9
23.9
24.0
24.2
29.7
34.8
36.0
42.7
45.5
52.4
53.2
Germany
Austria
Malta
Denmark
Netherlands
Estonia
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Lithuania
Latvia
Slovenia
Hungary
Finland
Luxembourg
Sweden
Belgium
Bulgaria
Poland
Ireland
Romania
France
Slovakia
Portugal
Cyprus
Italy
Croatia
Greece
Spain
0 10 20 30 40 50
Source: Office for National Statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7 
sim europe POLICY BRIEF #2016/01
As the 2015 SJI report demonstrates, the UK has 
both strengths and weaknesses in terms of creating 
opportunities for young people. Its major strength is 
its labour market, which produces a high number of 
jobs and relatively low unemployment rates. Overall, 
the 2015 SJI report ranks the UK’s labour market as 
fifth in the EU, behind only those of Denmark, Aus-
tria, Germany and Sweden. Yet despite this strong 
employment performance, this paper’s introduction 
has shown how many young people continue to 
experience problems related to poverty, unemploy-
ment and social exclusion. In particular, three chal-
lenges stand out as a priority for policy attention.
2.1 Structural disengagement
A first challenge is the urgent need to prevent so many 
young people from ‘slipping through the net’. At 
present, a combination of factors has led to thousands 
of disadvantaged and unemployed young people 
becoming disengaged from the support services pro- 
vided by the welfare state. These include the in-
creased difficulty in claiming eligibility for benefits as 
well as reports of an increased sense of stigmatization 
towards receiving social security payments (Baumberg 
et al, 2012). This explains why, although 11.6 percent  
of 18-24 year-olds were reported as being unemployed 
in October 2015, only 2.1 percent claimed Jobseeker’s  
Allowance (JSA), the UK’s prime unemployment ben- 
efit. This is a significant gap that indicates a group 
of young people who are in need of support but are 
either ineligible or unwilling to claim it. 
Failing to monitor the destinations and experiences of  
so many disadvantaged young people presents an  
inevitable policy challenge for the UK government: 
successfully targeting any intervention, no matter  
how well designed and intentioned, will always be  
difficult when so many potential beneficiaries  
cannot be identified. As a consequence, the National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research (2013)  
argues that as long as policies ignore the “structurally 
disengaged”, any interventions to tackle youth exclu-
sion will be severely limited.
2.2 Labour market disadvantages
The second challenge for the UK relates to a range of  
labour market disadvantages experienced by young 
people. The first of these is the relatively high rate of  
young people who are NEET. Whilst the UK has 
avoided the dramatically high NEET rates of 20 per- 
cent or more that characterize countries such as 
Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Spain (see Figure 6), its 2015 
rate of 16.5 percent is notably higher than in other 
northern European countries, such as the Netherlands 
(7.8 percent), Denmark (8.4 percent) and Germany 
(9.5 percent). 
A major cause of high NEET rates is the difficulty 
many young people experience in undertaking  
the transition from education to the labour market. 
In this respect, the UK’s rate of early school leavers 
—defined as the percentage of 18-24 year-olds not in 
education or training with at most lower secondary 
education—stood at 11.8 percent in 2015, compared to 
8.5 percent in France and 9.5 percent in Germany. 
More acutely, the uneven geographical distribution 
of young ‘NEETs’ is a further cause for concern.  
In the middle of 2015, only 10.6 percent of young 
people in London were classified as NEET (Delebarre,  
2015). Similarly low figures were recorded in the 
East of England (11.6 percent) and the East Midlands 
(12.8 percent). Here, the NEET rates are comparable 
to some of the better performing countries in the 
EU, such as Sweden (9.8 percent) and Luxembourg 
(10.2 percent). However, in the North-East of  
England, 22.9 percent of young people were NEET  
in mid-2015. This rate is higher than in some of  
the crisis-hit states, such as Portugal (19 percent) 
and Ireland (20.9 percent) and underlines the 
intense geographical inequalities of opportunity 
throughout the UK.
2. 
Challenges
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long-term confidence in the higher education 
system.
The final issue confronting UK policy-makers is 
long-term youth unemployment. As Figure 7 shows, 
the number of young people unemployed for over 
12 months stood at around 15 percent in the years 
preceding the financial crisis. From 2008 it began to 
rise, reaching a peak of over 30 percent between 2012 
and 2014. More recently, long-term youth unem-
ployment has begun to fall quite dramatically, yet at 
the end of 2015 over a fifth (22.7 percent) of young 
people remained long-term unemployed: a signif-
icantly higher rate than pre-crisis levels. Continu-
ing to focus on reducing the number of long-term 
young unemployed people should be a priority for 
Source: Social Justice Index (SJI), 2015
Figure 6
EU NEET RATES 2015
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Yet it is not just ‘NEETs’ who experience disruptive 
transitions from education to the labour market. 
Whilst the UK had a relatively high graduate employ-
ment rate of 83.2 percent in 2014 (Eurostat, 2016), 
with only 7 percent of graduates becoming unem-
ployed after completing higher education (HE) in the 
year 2013/2014, around a third of 2014 graduates were 
employed in non-professional, low-skilled jobs that do 
not require degree-level qualifications (HESA, 2015). 
This is an economic challenge, signifying the UK’s 
difficulty in establishing itself as a more high-skilled, 
high-waged economy, and a social one. As gradu-
ates in England have paid up to £9,000 per year for 
a degree course, the difficulty many experience in 
entering professional jobs may ultimately undermine 
9 
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Whilst the labour market succeeds in creating a rela- 
tive abundance of jobs, many of these tend to be at 
the insecure and low-paid end of the market, espe- 
cially for young people. Thus, despite robust jobs 
growth in the past two years, real living standards in 
the UK have stagnated and in 2015 real GDP per head 
remained lower than in 2007. 
The UK’s low pay challenge is highlighted in the 2015 
SJI report, which shows that 6.2 percent of full-time 
workers are at risk of poverty; a figure that is around 
double the in-work poverty rate of Denmark (2.7 per-
cent), Ireland (2.9 percent) and Finland (3.2 percent). 
Further, 34.6 percent of low-skilled workers have  
low wages in the UK. This compares unfavourably to 
low pay incidence in Sweden (4.2 percent), France 
(11.9 percent) and Denmark (14.8 percent). Concern 
over low-paid and precarious work has become a cen-
tral feature of UK political discourse, with prominent 
recent debates surrounding ‘zero hours contracts’ 
and proposed cuts to working tax credits, which are 
overwhelmingly claimed by low-paid workers.
UK policy-makers. Failing to do so risks creating a 
‘lost generation’, burdened by the scarring effects of 
unemployment outlined above (2,2). 
2.3 Living standards
The third and final issue for the UK is the relatively 
low living standards experienced by young people, 
which in turn stem from two separate challenges. The 
initial challenge is the lack of eligibility many young 
people encounter in claiming social security, meaning 
many face a dual exclusion. On the one hand, the ab-
sence of social security entitlement exposes many of 
them to the risk of poverty and social exclusion and 
enforces a reliance on informal means of economic 
support, such as the family. On the other hand, it also 
means many young people are directly excluded from 
further support, in particular in the form of welfare-
to-work interventions.
The second issue for living standards stems from some 
of the UK’s structural labour market weaknesses. 
Figure 7
LONG-TERM YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN THE UK
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2016
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3.1 2008 – 2010
In response to growing concerns around rising youth 
unemployment during the financial crisis, in 2009 
the then Labour government under Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown introduced the Young Person’s Guar-
antee (YPG): a range of measures aimed at promoting 
re-employment amongst young people. The most 
important component was the Future Jobs Fund (FJF): 
an intervention aimed at creating subsidized jobs 
for young unemployed people. The FJF was targeted 
at 18-24 year-olds and introduced in October 2009, 
subsequently creating over 100,000 jobs up to 2011 at 
a cost of £700 million.
Its central rationale stemmed from the international 
evidence base on the long-term scarring effects of 
youth unemployment, such as future likelihood of 
low pay and repeated ‘churning’ between benefit re-
ceipt and insecure work (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011); 
the provision of paid work would stop young people 
experiencing a prolonged spell of unemployment and 
thus such ‘scarring’.
To achieve this, the FJF provided young unemployed 
people with temporary jobs payable at the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW). Employers from the pub-
lic, private and third sectors bid to recruit from the 
programme on condition that any positions would 
be additional to existing jobs—not replacing work 
that would otherwise be done by a paid employee. FJF 
positions had to last for at least 25 hours per week for 
a minimum of six months, guarantee post-placement 
job support to participants and offer a benefit to local 
communities. As well as immediate employment, 
the ultimate objective was to provide young people 
with the skills and experience to secure unsubsidized, 
market-driven employment in the long-term. 
3.2 2010 – 2015
Upon taking office in 2010, the Conservative-Lib-
eral Democrat coalition government abolished the 
FJF, with the final placements beginning in March 
2011. The rationale behind its decision was that the 
programme was deemed too expensive and largely 
ineffective in tackling youth unemployment. In 2010, 
the Prime Minister David Cameron said:
The Future Jobs Fund has been one of the most ineffec-
tive jobs schemes there has been. One month after the 
programme, half the people that were on it were back 
on the dole (JSA). It failed.
However, a Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
analysis (2012) published two years later show it to 
be, albeit retrospectively, a successful intervention. 
Two years after the programme, FJF participants 
were 11 percent more likely to be in employment and 
seven percent less likely to receive benefits com-
pared to equivalent non-participants. The DWP’s 
findings mirrored an earlier evaluation by the Centre 
for Economic and Social Inclusion (2011) that found a 
range of positive effects, including strong employer 
engagement and reductions in long-term benefit 
receipt.
The coalition government replaced the FJF and YPG 
with the Youth Contract: a broad programme of 
support encompassing training, work experience 
placements and guaranteed job interviews. The Youth 
Contract’s flagship policy, however, was a wage 
incentive of up to £2,275 for employers that provided 
young people on the Work Programme, the govern-
ment’s prime welfare-to-work scheme, with a job. 
The mechanism was specifically designed to counter 
what the coalition government perceived to be FJF’s 
major limitation. Instead of creating subsidized jobs 
predominantly in the public and third sectors, the 
Youth Contract wage incentive was designed to en-
courage employment with private sector companies 
that, over time, would become unsubsidized.
The performance of the Youth Contract was limit-
ed, with only 36,470 wage incentive payments over 
three years. This figure is set in the context of an 
3. 
Government reactions
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Whilst many European countries have sought over 
the past two decades to adopt aspects of UK labour 
market reforms, such as flexibility and activation, 
there are several areas in which the UK could in turn 
learn from examples of effective policy-making in 
other EU states. 
The first area is related to education to work tran-
sitions. Of the countries that succeed in achieving 
notably low levels of youth unemployment, such as 
Austria (10.3 percent) and Germany (7.7 percent), one 
determinant of success is providing a diverse range 
of choices upon leaving secondary education, from 
conventional higher education routes to high-qual-
ity apprenticeships. In the UK, whilst the number of 
apprenticeships has been rising in recent years, there 
remain deep concerns about the quality of the options 
available to young people. In 2015 Sir Michael Wilshaw, 
the Chief Inspector of Schools in England, criticized 
existing provision, arguing that a rise in the number of 
overall target of supporting 150,000 young people 
into jobs. Given this poor performance, and a gen-
erally improving labour market environment, it was 
announced in 2014 that the Youth Contract would be 
discontinued. The government argued that funding 
could be better targeted towards the most disad-
vantaged groups, such as young people from ethnic 
minorities. The final wage incentives were distributed 
from August 2014, with the scheme formally ending 
in March 2015.
3.3 2015 – Present
In 2013, David Cameron announced at his party’s 
conference that a future majority Conservative gov-
ernment would implement a new approach to youth 
disadvantage, restricting young people’s options to 
either “earning or learning” after leaving school, 
with no option of remaining on benefits in the long-
term. With their overall majority election victory in 
May 2015, the Conservatives now have the opportu-
nity to implement this approach. To this end, the Full 
Employment and Welfare Benefits Bill, included in 
the 2015 Queen’s Speech, set out several key reforms.
The first of these is that unemployed 18-21 year-olds 
will no longer be eligible for JSA but will instead re-
ceive a new social security benefit: the Youth Allow-
ance. The key difference with JSA is a more targeted 
system of means-testing and a stronger system of 
conditionality; this will be imposed from day one of a 
claim, with the requirement to complete an appren-
ticeship, training or work placement after six months 
of continuous benefit receipt. The second key reform 
is that eligibility for housing support will be removed 
from 18-21 year-olds except for those in exception-
al circumstances. The government’s rationale is 
that ending housing benefits for young people will 
discourage them from leaving home and claiming 
out-of-work benefits.
3.4 SIM Europe Reform Barometer Analysis
The 2015 SIM Europe Reform Barometer (Arpe et al, 
2015) assessed the above policy developments in a 
broadly critical light. In particular, expert respon- 
dents noted that recent UK government policy and 
rhetoric had resulted, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
in stigmatizing and demonizing people on out-of-
work benefits. In addition, policy reforms—such as 
frozen benefit rates, increased conditionality and 
housing benefit changes—had increased the eco-
nomic pressures felt by many households. As argued 
below, such changes impact on young people in two 
ways: the first way indirectly, by reducing family in-
comes and therefore increasing the likelihood of child 
poverty, and the second more directly, by removing 
benefits from previously eligible young people. 
4. 
EU Comparisons
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OECD (2013); all data for 2011 with the exception of PES and training expenditure for the UK (2009).
Figure 8
VARIATION IN EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF ALMP AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GDP IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES
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apprenticeships on offer had seen a corresponding di-
lution in the quality of choices available (Ofsted, 2015).
Far from providing young people with skills in strong 
demand from employers, Wilshaw argued that large 
numbers of existing apprenticeships were offering 
low-grade skills in occupational sectors such as retail 
and customer service. Further, the number of young 
people progressing to apprenticeships remained 
comparatively low at just five percent. Given the 
unique opportunity to expand the uptake of appren-
ticeships via raising the mandatory participation 
age from 16 to 18, the failure to improve their quality 
constitutes, as it stands, a missed opportunity to 
transform the education-to-work transition for many 
young people missing out on higher education.
The second way in which the UK could learn from other 
EU states regards the level of investment in active la-
bour market programmes (ALMPs). Whilst reforms over 
the past two decades have ‘activated’ the UK welfare 
state, expenditure on ALMPs remains relatively low.
ALMP spending can be divided between expenditure 
on two different types of support. The first relates to 
the Public Employment Service (PES), typified by the 
UK’s Work Programme and consisting of more in ten- 
sified systems of advice and support, whilst the 
second relates to programmes more strongly aimed 
at training and skills development. Figure 8 demon-
strates that in EU countries for which data are avai- 
lable, the most recent statistics show that the UK 
spent the lowest on training measures (0.02 percent 
of GDP) but had a relatively high expenditure on  
advice and support via the PES (0.34 percent). Con-
trastingly, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Denmark  
all have training expenditure over 0.40 percent of 
GDP, whilst Denmark also combines training with 
high spending on the PES (0.67 percent). 
Figure 9 breaks down spending on re-employment 
measures in the UK, showing that the vast majority 
of expenditure goes on the PES and conventional 
unemployment benefits, with only minimal amounts 
spent on schemes designed to boost human capital 
development, such as training, work experience and 
employment incentives for employers. Boosting 
spending on such policies, as is more common in 
other EU states, could succeed in tackling some  
of the labour market problems faced by young people 
outlined in Section 2.
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On 23rd June 2016 the UK public will vote in a refer-
endum to decide whether to remain a member state 
of the European Union or leave. Whilst public debate 
is framed predominantly around issues of sovereignty 
and the economic impact of leaving, the question of 
the consequences for vulnerable young people is also 
crucial.
One argument used by ‘Brexit’ advocates is that high 
levels of migration from the rest of the EU, especially 
from low-skilled workers, exacerbate many problems 
young British people face in finding employment. 
With stronger control of national borders, future 
UK governments would have the power to reform 
migration policy to expand and protect labour market 
opportunities for young people, they claim. 
Whilst there is some evidence to suggest that the 
rising number of NEETs since the mid-2000s can be 
partially attributed to rising EU migration, Britton 
(2012) estimates that only a fifth of this increase 
across the UK can be attributed to high immigration, 
The third and final lesson the UK could learn from other 
countries is to improve measures known to boost family 
household incomes and lower child poverty. The UK 
should look in this regard at policies developed in the 
Nordic states. As the 2015 SJI report notes:
When it comes to pro-young and family-friendly poli-
cies, the provision of day care and preschool facilities as 
well as generous parental-leave schemes is exemplary. 
Their successful approach to combining parenting and 
the labour market can serve as an inspiration for policy 
reforms in other countries. 
To the government’s credit, there has been recent pro-
gress along these lines, with the introduction of shared 
parental leave and future plans to expand the number of 
hours of free childcare. However, given the long-term 
squeeze on UK living standards and the rise in child 
poverty, it is imperative that the government builds 
upon such reforms sooner rather than later in order to 
improve employment incentives for parents. Accord-
ing to the OECD, the UK has one of the most expensive 
childcare systems in the world. Improving employment 
incentives for parents could go some way to raising 
living standards for children and young people.
Source: Social Justice Index (SJI), 2015
Figure 9
UK EXPENDITURE ON POLICIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
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6. 
Conclusions
with no explanation at all for regions outside of  
London. Consequently, it seems unlikely that any  
reduction in the number of migrants post-Brexit 
would do much, if at all, to combat the UK’s youth 
unemployment problems.
Alternatively, there is a danger that a Brexit could 
result in the withdrawal of funding support for pro-
jects that help fight youth disadvantage and unem-
ployment. Between 2014 and 2020, the European 
Social Fund (ESF) plans to invest close to €12 billion 
on interventions in the UK. Many ESF projects are 
specifically intended to support long-term, young 
unemployed people in disadvantaged parts of the  
UK and the ESF budget includes funding designated 
for the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI): a policy 
targeted at European regions where over 25 percent  
of young people are unemployed. 
That these more disadvantaged parts of the UK  
receive significant levels of EU support is an often- 
neglected part of the Brexit debate. In the event  
of a Brexit, such regions could face a significant gap 
in provision that could intensify already high levels  
of social exclusion and unemployment.
Improving youth opportunities is a major priority for  
social policy across Europe and especially so in the 
UK, where the living standards of many young people 
have worsened in recent years and a relatively large 
number experience profound labour market disad- 
vantages. This policy brief has highlighted three  
particular challenges for the UK: a stronger integra-
tion of young people within the social security  
system; improving the transition from education  
to the labour market; and enhancing economic 
security and living standards for children and young 
people. It is in these three areas that this report  
concludes with policy recommendations.
6.1 Integration with social security provision
A major disadvantage of recent government at-
tempts to target youth disadvantage has been their 
limited scope. Programmes such as the FJF and the 
Youth Allowance have only been available for young 
people entitled to JSA. Yet there are large numbers 
of young people who are unemployed and not in ed-
ucation or training (NEETs) that do not receive social 
security payments. As a result, many excluded young 
people are failing to meet the eligibility require-
ments for government programmes. Rather than 
being disqualified from further support, such young 
people need the assistance of the welfare state more 
than ever.
There are two mechanisms through which young peo - 
ple could be better integrated with the welfare state. 
First, eligibility for employment support and youth 
welfare-to-work programmes should be expanded.  
At present, eligibility is most often determined  
by entitlement to JSA, which is claimed only by a  
minority. Even more so, access to welfare-to-work 
schemes—like the government’s flagship Work  
Programme—often comes only after a prolonged 
period of unemployment.
This consequently means that two crucial groups of  
young people are often excluded from additional sup-
port structures: young unemployed people who fail 
to qualify for JSA in the first place and, second, those 
who qualify but then exit JSA relatively quickly. Im- 
portantly, whilst many within this second group are 
individuals who will find sustainable, long-term em- 
ployment, it also includes those who drift bet ween 
short-term, insecure jobs and benefit receipt. So  
those within this second group evidently require ad-
ditional support to ensure they find sustainable work.
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Access to welfare-to-work programmes and other  
forms of advice and support should therefore be 
decoupled from eligibility for JSA and its successor, 
the Youth Allowance. At present, eligibility for JSA 
is either contributions-based or, in the event of an 
insufficient contributory record, means-tested. The 
shift to the Youth Allowance will mean that wel-
fare support for young people will become entirely 
means-tested through the assessment of parental 
incomes as the main criteria for eligibility. This will 
likely mean even fewer unemployed young people 
eligible for social security support. 
Decoupling access to welfare-to-work programmes 
from eligibility for the Youth Allowance would mean 
that the work and training opportunities under it will 
become available to all young people irrespective of 
entitlement to financial support. Reintegrating young 
people within the structures of the welfare state 
could help tackle both the short-term and long-term 
dimensions of youth exclusion that this report has 
identified.
Second, whilst it is important to ensure young people 
face incentives to work or train, this urgently needs 
to be matched with appropriate levels of economic 
support in order to combat poverty and social exclu-
sion. Evidence suggests that providing social security 
to young people does not interfere with the incentive 
to work. According to recent analysis (AVECO, 2012), 
young people who are eligible for benefits would still 
be within the region of £2,300 to £3,700 per year 
better off in work than on benefits.
This is why recent proposals to further curtail social 
security entitlements for young people risk doing  
far more harm than good. In particular, the proposed 
removal of Housing Benefit entitlement for young 
people should be rethought. There is minimal evi-
dence that eligibility for Housing Benefits provides  
an incentive for young people to leave family homes 
and remain unemployed. Contrastingly, there are 
strong reasons to believe that Housing Benefit 
provides many young people with a basic level of 
economic security with which to search for, find and 
maintain employment. 
Within this context, that the vast majority of young 
unemployed people find work within 12 months is 
testament to the fact that social security—including 
Housing Benefit—may actually promote re-employ-
ment and prevent short-term spells of joblessness 
from turning into long-term unemployment. The pro- 
posed changes to Housing Benefit are estimated to 
save just £135 million over four years, highlighting 
the danger that only meagre savings will be achieved 
for a policy that could be damaging economically and 
socially.
6.2 Education to labour market transitions
The UK needs to do more to improve the transition 
between education and the labour market for young 
people. That this is a problem for the UK is evident 
in its relatively high NEET rate of close to 17 percent. 
Several measures are available to the government 
to improve education to work transitions. The first 
is to introduce stronger forms of economic support 
for young people from low-income backgrounds to 
remain in full-time academic education. Although 
this provision exists in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales in the form of the Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA)—a means-tested payment to in-
centivize staying in full-time education beyond 16 
—this was abolished in England by the former coali-
tion government.
Although since 2015 all young people have been re-
quired to remain in some form of education until the 
age of 18, targeted economic support could encour-
age those from low-income households to pursue 
academic qualifications. This contrasts with feeling 
compelled to combine paid work with some form of 
continued training or education. There is undoubted 
value in apprenticeships and work-based training but 
the strongest evidence suggests that higher educa-
tion continues to bring higher income returns (BIS, 
2011). Thus, it is imperative the government encour-
ages those who are capable of remaining in further 
education to do so irrespective of family incomes. 
The second measure is to ensure that the training 
offered to young people, especially unemployed ones, 
is of high quality. Whilst the current government’s 
commitment to ensure that all young people are of-
fered an apprenticeship, training or work placement 
after six months of unemployment is an important 
step towards breaking the cycle of disadvantage, 
there remain important concerns about quality. For  
instance, it is vital that such opportunities represent 
forms of support that provide young people with the 
relevant ‘hard skills’ that employers require, rather 
than focusing predominantly on a purported lack of 
‘soft skills’.
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There is a danger, however, that this latter option is 
being over-emphasized at the expense of the former. 
Whilst defending the Youth Allowance, the Cabinet 
Minister Matthew Hancock said the reforms would 
undermine a pervasive “welfare culture” amongst 
young British people. Yet, explaining youth exclusion 
by reference to a “welfare culture” risks minimizing 
some of the more structural causes of youth disad-
vantage, such as low skills, poor health and weak 
labour demand. 
If indeed the Youth Allowance is designed to “end 
rolling welfare dependency for good,” the options 
available to young people run the risk of having as 
their prime aim the imposition of soft skills and the 
‘right attitudes’, rather than well-funded, quali-
ty training and work opportunities that boost hard 
skills. In this light, government proposals to send 
young people to “work boot camps” are troubling.
6.3 Living standards and economic security
Stagnant wages and recent welfare reforms have 
meant that the UK is struggling to ensure economic 
security for many families with children. This has 
occurred both indirectly, through benefit cuts that 
have impacted child poverty levels, and directly,  
as social security entitlement for young people has 
been withdrawn in some areas, such as the EMA. 
This arguably constitutes a regression on the part 
of the UK, where social policies introduced by the 
1997-2010 Labour governments made serious dents 
into child poverty. According to Waldfogel (2010), 
this was achieved through a three-pronged approach 
that combined the promotion of parental employ-
ment, increased economic support for families and 
investment in early years development and educa-
tion. Whilst recent governments have continued to 
prioritize the promotion of employment, less invest-
ment has been made in family economic support and 
early years development. 
This is perhaps central in explaining the worsening 
social situation for many children and young people. 
As the 2015 SJI report argues, both targeted support 
and investment in early-childhood education are 
fundamental components of any strategy designed  
to tackle youth disadvantage.
Still, perhaps the strongest option available to the 
present government is to act far more quickly to 
incentivize dual parental employment. As this report 
has argued, the government is making progress on 
this measure through the introduction of shared 
parental leave and plans to extend free childcare, but 
existing policies are small steps and need to be quick-
ly built upon. High maternal employment rates are 
known to go hand-in-hand with lower child poverty 
rates (Bell and Strelitz, 2011). To this end, policies 
that genuinely provide parents with flexi-bility in 
their jobs, as well as the economic incentives to  
remain in work—such as affordable childcare—are  
of profound importance. 
In recent years the UK’s labour market has been rela- 
tively effective in bringing down youth unemploy-
ment levels. However, the government continues to 
face a significant challenge in tackling other dimen- 
sions of youth disadvantage. Too many young people 
are excluded from the support of the welfare state, 
struggle in the transition between education and work  
and have suffered from stagnant or falling family  
incomes. Collectively, addressing these three weak-
nesses provides the best strategy for raising the  
living standards and social conditions of children and 
young people.
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